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Abstract
This paper investigates the eects of a decrease in xed costs on the division
of labor within rms. In the constant markup rate model, a decrease in xed costs
curbs the division of labor. In the short run, the division of labor is promoted
through labor reallocation within rms while in the long run, the division of labor
is curbed through labor reallocation across rms. The latter eect dominates the
former eect. In the variable markup rate model whose markup rate depends on
the number of rms, the decrease in xed costs induces labor reallocation across
rms which is the opposite direction of that of the constant markup rate model in
addition. The direction of labor reallocation across rms based on procompetition
is opposite to that of the model of Kamei (2014) which does not impose free-entry
and free-exit condition. The free-entry and free-exit condition plays a key role in
determining the direction of that reallocation based on procompetition eect.
Keywords: xed costs; division of labor within rms; labor reallocation
JEL classication numbers: E23; E24; J24; L16; L22
1 Introduction
Many studies have modeled how the promotion of the division of labor raises rm pro-
ductivity. However, most of these studies focus on the optimal rm structure problem
that rms face and do not clarify the relationship between the number of rms and the
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division of labor. When xed costs decrease, what is the relationship between rms'
entry to and exit from markets and the division of labor? Moreover, how is the labor
force reallocated? Can these properties be changed by a competitive environment? This
paper presents a simple model to investigate these problems.
We construct a model that is quite similar to Chaney and Ossa (2013). Chaney and
Ossa (2013) succeed in formalizing Adam Smith's (1776) pin factory story. Although
Chaney and Ossa (2013) do not assume xed costs, we assume xed costs. In addition,
we formulate a variable markup rate model following Blanchard and Givazzi (2003).
Their variable markup rate depends on the number of rms. We compare the eects of
a decrease in xed costs on the division of labor between both of our models.
This paper's main results are as follows. Under constant markup rate, positive xed
costs, and a free-entry and free-exit condition, a decrease in xed costs curbs the division
of labor. This result can be decomposed into two eects in the short run and long run. In
the short run, the division of labor is promoted through labor reallocation within rms
while in the long run, the division of labor is curbed through labor reallocation across
rms. The latter eect dominates the former eect. Hence, an essential source of the
division of labor in the long run is labor reallocation across rms. In the variable markup
rate model, the decrease in xed costs induces labor reallocation across rms which is the
opposite direction of that of the constant markup rate model in addition although the
direction of labor reallocation within rms is the same as that of the constant markup
rate model.
The results of the variable markup rate model are in contrast with Kamei (2014).
Kamei (2014) indicates that an increase in the number of rms curbs the division of
labor without imposing the free-entry and free-exit condition. On the other hand, our
variable markup rate model indicates that labor reallocation based on procompetition
eect promotes the division of labor while that reallocation raises the number of rms,
real wage rate increase, and rm output. This suggests that the free-entry and free-exit
condition plays a key role in determining the direction of that reallocation based on
procompetition eect.
This division of labor is interpreted often as the division of labor not only within
rms but also across rms within an industry and across industries. For example, Ethier
(1982) treats the division of labor as an expansion of the varieties of intermediate goods.
In this paper, the division of labor is treated as a narrower task set in which each worker
engages.
In addition to Chaney and Ossa (2013), some studies formalize the division of labor
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within rms. Edwards and Starr (1987) present a model in which the division of labor
is not a sucient condition for increasing returns to scale. Swanson (1999) presents a
quite simple model that analyzes the relationship among human capital investment, the
division of labor, and rm productivity. Becker and Murphy (1992) show explicitly that
the cost of promoting the division of labor is coordination cost.
Some empirical studies show a positive relationship between rm productivity and the
division of labor within rms for both the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors.
Baumgardner (1988) indicates that more populous counties have more medical special-
ists. Garicano and Hubbard (2008) present similar results for law rms. Borghans and
Weel (2006) suggests rm productivity improvements induced by the division of labor
within rms through communication technology adoption, which reduces the coordina-
tion cost within rms by using a survey among Dutch establishments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes rm structure.
Section 3 analyzes equilibrium allocation. Section 4 analyzes how a decrease in xed
costs aects the division of labor and social welfare. Section 5 analyzes labor reallocation
behind the decrease in xed costs. Section 6 compares the results between constant and
variable markup rate models. Finally, we present the Conclusion and Appendix.
2 Firm structure
We introduce the division of labor into a trade model of monopolistic competition with
xed costs. The setup of the model is based on Chaney and Ossa (2013). To begin with,
we consider rm structure.
We introduce the division of labor within rms similarly to Chaney and Ossa (2013)
for the following reason. Traditional production management, which is the scientic
management advocated by Frederick Taylor, promotes the division of labor and produc-
tion on a large scale. However, today, team production is important in many industries,
as reported by Daft (2000). Chaney and Ossa (2013) explicitly allow such a production
management approach, and hence, we also adopt it.
2.1 Optimal competency
Each rm produces a variety of dierentiated nal goods. As for the production of goods,
we modify the model developed by Chaney and Ossa (2013). Many tasks are sequentially
distributed over the set [0; 2] for each rm. One unit of nal good is produced by inputting
one unit of preliminary good for task set [0; 2]. A rm assigns these tasks to t teams,
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where t 2 R+. One unit of preliminary good for a certain task set [!; !] is produced by
inputting the following units of labor:
l(!; !) =
1
2

Z !
!
j!c   !jd!| {z }
Area of two right-angled triangles
; !c 2 [0; 2];  > 0; (1)
where !c denotes this team's core competency, and  denotes the team's burden pa-
rameter. Core competency is a task that the team is most suited to undertake. As 
is high, certain task sets require more labor.  can be interpreted as the diculty of
multitasking.
The rm assigns a core competency to each team; that is, the core competency is
endogenously determined. The optimal core competency is a solution of the following
cost minimization problem; l(!; !) = min!c2[!;!] l(!; !). The optimal core competency
is certainly the midpoint in the assigned task set as follows:
!cj[!;!] =
! + !
2
: (2)
This is because each task set is symmetric with respect to the core competency (See
Appendix A for a detailed derivation).
2.2 Optimal number of teams
Figure 1 illustrates these features for task set [0; 4=t] when t is a positive integer. The
integral term in (1) corresponds to the area of two right-angled triangles formed in linear
symmetry with respect to the vertical direction shown in Figure 1.1)
(1) and (2) derives labor input per one unit of preliminary good for an arbitrary task
set [!; !] as follows (See Appendix A for the detailed derivation):
l(!; !) = 2l(!; !cj[!;!]): (3)
Because the teams are symmetric, the identical range of the task subset, [0; 2=t], is
assigned to each team and then, the labor input of each reach is identical.
Let llinejunit denote labor requirements on product line for one unit of output. By
combining (1) for each team, llinejunit is given as follows (See Appendix A for the detailed
1) For the assumption of l(!; !), Chaney and Ossa (2013) adopt a more general form, l(!; !) =
1
2
R !
!

!+!
2   !

d!, where  > is a positive parameter. By formulating l(!; !) in the same way as (1),
we can make the model highly tractable. See Appendix C for the generality of the technology in (1).
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Figure 1: sequential task structure
derivation):
llinejunit = t
 Z 1=t
0
!d!
!
: (4)
Figure 2 illustrates this features.
Figure 2: sequential task structure
(4) indicates that as the number of teams increases, labor input per one team con-
verges with order 2 to 0 from
R 1=t
0
!d! = =(2t2), while the number of teams diverges
with order 1 to +1. Hence, as the number of teams increases, lprejunit decreases.
Let lline denote labor requirements on product line for y units of output. FromR 1=t
0
!d! = 1=(2t2), lline is given by
lline = y  llinejunit = y
2t
:
5
Organizing one team requires f(> 0) units of labor, which is interpreted as coordination
costs.2) Then, y units of nal goods are produced for a given number of teams, t, by
inputting the following units of labor:
l(t; y) = tf + lline = tf +
y
2t
:
Each rm selects the number of teams t such that the abovementioned labor input
l(t; y) is minimized. In this problem, the rm experiences a tradeo among productivity
improvements by increasing the number of teams and costs of organizing teams. The
optimal number of teams t is
t(y) =

y
2f
1=2
This implies that as rm size increases, the extent of the division of labor increases.
2.3 Total cost function and the extent of the division of labor
Each rm inputs labor into the production divisions and a further fd(> 0) units of
labor into the management division, where fd(> 0) is xed and wfd represents overhead
production costs. Total labor input is l + fd.
Combining l(t; y) and t(y) gives the total cost function under the optimal organization
as follows (See the Appendix for the detailed derivation):
TC(y) = wl(y) + wfd = w(2fy)
1=2 + wfd: (5)
This derives the average cost function, AC(y) = TC(y)=y = w [(2f)=y]1=2, and the
marginal cost function, MC(y) = dTC(y)=dy = (w=2) [(2f)=y]1=2. Both cost functions
are decreasing for y.
On the other hand, l(t(y); y) derives the production function as y = l2=(2f) under
the optimal division of labor. This indicates that average and marginal labor productivity
are increasing for l. This indicate a reverse causal relationship to the proposition, for
example, that of Melitz (2003), which indicates that high productivity rms become
large rms.
These productivity and cost functions have the following relationship with the extent
of the division of labor.
2) f can be interpreted as midlevel management costs. Because each team specializes in a certain task
set, the rm needs coordinators. Becker and Murphy (1992) emphasized that coordination cost acts as
a brake for the division of labor.
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Proposition 1. As the extent of the division of labor becomes greater, marginal cost
decreases and marginal productivity increases.
Proof : See Appendix C.
From this proposition, we can use the number of teams as measurements of rm
productivity.
3 Equilibrium allocation
3.1 Households
There are L units of households, and each household supplies one unit of labor in-
elastically at wage rate w. The preference of each consumer is given by a constant
elasticity of substitution utility function over a continuum of goods indexed by : U =R
2 c()
d
1=
; 0 <  < 1, where the measure of the set  represents the mass
of available dierentiated goods, and c() represents the consumption of variety .
From standard utility maximization, the price index can be obtained as follows: P =R
2 (p())
1  d
1=(1 )
, where  = 1=(1   ) > 1 is the elasticity of the substitution
between any two varieties and also represents the price elasticity of demand for each
variety.
3.2 Equilibrium conditions
We analyze the rm's prot maximization problem in a market of monopolistic compe-
tition. Each rm experiences a residual demand curve with constant elasticity , and
therefore, sets p = MC(y), where   =(   1) and MC(y)  dTC(y)=dy. Using
l(t; y), this optimal pricing rule is written by the PP schedule as follows
PP :
p
w
=

2

2f
y
1=2
: (6)
Firms can enter and exit freely. This gives zero prot  = 0; this is written by p = AC(y),
where AC(y)  TC(y)=y. Using l(t; y), this free-entry and free-exit condition is written
by the FE schedule as follows:
FE :
p
w
=

2f
y
1=2
+
fd
y
: (7)
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(6) and (7) characterize (y; p=w) at equilibrium as follows: yE = f
2
d=(2fB
2), and
(p=w)E = B(B+1)2f=fd, where B is dened as B  =2 1 and subscript E represents
variables in equilibrium.
3.3 Internal solution
Hereafter, Assumption 1 holds in order to ensure a unique internal solution.
Assumption 1. 3) 0 < B <1, that is, 2 <  <1 (1 <  < 2) and fd > 0 hold.
We can immediately obtain the next proposition from yE and (p=w)E.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, a unique internal solution exists in which y > 0
and p=w > 0.
Note that if fd = 0 holds, then the internal solution does not exist.
4) Hence, we need
to assume fd > 0. Even if fd > 0, under   2, y ! 1; that is, the internal solution
requires a suciently low elasticity of substitution among varieties as consumers value
variety strongly).
Figure 3: Equilibrium allocation and a decrease in xed cost
Figure 3 illustrates the features of autarkic equilibrium. The gure has a unique
intersection between the FE and PP curves at point E where (y; p=w) = (yE; (p=w)E).
The PP curve is cut by the FE curve only once. This ensures a unique internal solution.5)
3) This internal condition makes us reconsider rm technology as represented by (1). See Appendix C
for details. However, we adopt technology in (1) and Assumption 1 for analytical simplicity.
4) When fd = 0 and B = 0, equilibrium output y is not determined. When fd = 0 and B 6= 0,
equilibrium output y is zero or approaches positive innity.
5) The characteristics of Figure 3 are supported by Appendix D.
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Substitute yE into t(y) to yield the equilibrium level of t: tE = fd=(2fB). The
equilibrium level of l is obtained by substituting yE and tE into l(t; y): lE = fd=B.
Then, substitute lE into MPL(l) to yield MPLE = fd=(fB). This equation implies
thatMPLE = 2tE= = lE=(f). Furthermore, (w=p)E = tE=[(B+1)] = lE=[2(B+1)f ]
holds. In equilibrium, labor productivity and real wages are proportional to the number
of teams and the labor input on production divisions.
Now, we can completely characterize the equilibrium allocation by determining the
number of varieties. Labor-market clearing condition L = M(l + fd) gives the following
equilibrium number of varieties ME using lE: ME = [B=(B + 1)](L=fd).
6)
4 Impact of decrease in xed costs
4.1 Impact on division of labor
Signicant changes in management technology have occurred in the post-World War II
period (e.g., automatization, the IT revolution, and oshoring). These changes have
tended to decrease the xed labor inputs of head oces, such as clerks. In this section,
we analyze the impact of a decrease in xed costs on the division of labor.
As shown in Figure 3, a decrease in xed costs (from fd to f
0
d) shifts the FE curve
downward. Hence, we have new equilibrium at point E 0. Note that the only dierence
occurs from the xed costs term. This implies that we can obtain yE0 by replacing fd with
f 0d in yE: yE0 = f
0
d
2=(2fB2). In a similar manner, we obtain lE0 = f
0
d=B, tE0 = f
0
d=(2fB)
and ME0 = L=[(2fy)
1=2 + f 0d].
We nd yE0 < yE, (w=pd)E0 < (w=pd)E, tE0 < tE, lE0 < lE, MPLE0 < MPLE, and
ME0 > ME. ME0 > ME means that some rms enter the market. tE0 < tE means that
the division of labor is curbed by a decrease in xed costs. Hence, we obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1, a decrease in xed costs curbs the division of
labor.
Proof. From tE0   tE = (f 0d   fd)=(2fB) < 0, we obtain tE0 < tE. Q.E.D.
We can explain the mechanism behind this result from the viewpoint of labor reallo-
cation across rms. In Figure 3, the point E satises the optimal pricing rule, PP , and
not the free-entry and free-exit condition, FE 0. Hence, each rm has positive prot at
6) To obtain ME , we use the labor market-clearing condition and do not use the income{expenditure
clearing condition of each household, which is redundant in this equilibrium.
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the point E because the average cost is less than the price. Then, some rms try to enter
the market. To do so, these rms recruit workers from existing rms. This reallocation
across rms curbs the division of labor.
4.2 The impact on social welfare
We treat a representative household's utility as a measure of social welfare. Under the
utility maximization, the indirect utility function of each household is VE = (w=P )E. In
equilibrium, rms set the identical price, p, and from the denition of P , the following
relationship is given:
VE =

w
p

E
M
1
 1
E : (8)
Note that the indirect utility can be decomposed into the real wage rate and the num-
ber of varieties. We substitute (p=w)E and ME into (8), and consequently, we obtain
equilibrium social welfare as follows:
VE = (2f)
 1L
1
 1 (B + 1)
 
 1B
2 
 1fd
 2
 1 : (9)
By dierentiating VE of (9) with respect to fd, we obtain
VE
dfd
=  2  
   1
VE
fd
< 0:
Under Assumption 1, we obtain dVE=dfd < 0 from 1 <  < 2. Hence, we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 1, a decrease in xed costs raise social welfare.
This eect can be decomposed into a change in (w=p)E and M
1=( 1). A decrease in
xed costs curbs the division of labor, and then, reduces (w=p)E (negative productivity
eect) but raises M1=( 1) (positive variety eect). The latter dominates the former
eect, and hence, social welfare rises.
5 Labor reallocation within and across rms
In this section, we explicitly consider the labor reallocation behind the division of labor
that is promoted by a decrease in fd by decomposing the eect into a short run eect
and a long run eect.
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5.1 Labor reallocation in the short run
Previously, we studied equilibrium in which rms can freely enter and exit markets. That
is, such equilibrium has a time span in which entry and exit can be adjusted. We call
such a time span the long run. In this section, we study trade equilibrium in the short
run, in which the number of rms, M , cannot be adjusted. In particular, the zero prot
condition is not imposed.
From the labor market-clearing condition, M(l+ fd) = L, we can obtain labor input
on production divisions as follows
lS =
L
M
  fd; (10)
where subscript "S" represents variables in the short-run trading equilibrium.
(10), production function y = l2=2f , and optimal team numbers t(y) = [y=(2f)]1=2
give t in the short-run equilibrium as follows
tS =
lS
2f
=
1
2f

L
M
  fd

: (11)
(11) implies the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Under Assumption 1, a decrease in xed costs promotes the division of
labor in the short run.
This result is in contrast with that in the long run. We can explain a mechanism
behind these results form the viewpoint of labor allocation as follows.
(10) is equivalent to the following equation
Total labor input per one rmz }| {
lS|{z}
production division
+ fd|{z}
headquarter division
=

L
M

| {z }
constant
:
This means that there is no labor reallocation across rms by trade liberalization in the
short run because total labor input per rm is xed at L=M . All labor reallocation by
a decrease in fd in the short run is caused within rms.
A decrease in fd induces rms to increase labor input in production divisions through
the reduction of labor input in head oces. This, then, can promote the division of labor.
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5.2 Decomposition of labor reallocation
Now, we explicitly decompose the eect of a decrease in fd on tE into an eect in the
short run and long run as follows
dtE
dfd
=
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@fd|{z}
 | {z }
reallocation within rms ({)
+
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@ME| {z }
 
dME
dfd| {z }
 | {z }
reallocation across rms (+)
: (12)
From (12), the result of Proposition 3, and dtE=dfx > 0, we obtain the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 6. Under Assumption 1, a decrease in xed costs promotes the division of
labor in the short run while it curbs that in the long run. The latter eect dominates the
former. Labor reallocation across rms is an essential source of the division of labor in
the long run.
Figure 4: Productivity and labor reallocation in the short run and long run
For a decrease in fd under a partial regime, Figure 4 shows the decomposition of
the eects of a decrease in fd on marginal productivity into three eects. Figure 4
illustrates two production curves, PC 1 and PC 2 (PC 3) in (ltotal   y) space. ltotal is
a rm's total labor inputs. That is, ltotal is dened as ltotal = l + fd. Note that from
this denition, ltotalE   fd refers to the labor input of the production division, lE. Let lh
be the labor input of the head oce. ltotalE;j and l
h
j represent variables at the j-th stage
where j 2 f1; 2; 3g. In the rst stage of the initial equilibrium, we obtain each rm's
employment and production, which is represented by point A on PC 1. In the second
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stage after fd decrease and before the number of rms changes, this is represented by
point B. In the third stage after fd decrease and before the number of rms changes, it
is represented by point C.
The rst eect of a decrease in fd on marginal productivity is a transition from point
A on PC 1 to point B on PC 2 after a decrease in fd. At this stage, fd;2 < fd;1 hold. In
this transition, lE increases by interval fd;1fd;2. This indicates that in the short run, rms
reassign labor of interval fd;1fd;2 from the management division to the production division
(lhE;2 < l
h
E;1) while retaining l
total
E;1 units of total labor (l
total
E;2 = l
total
E;1 ). This reassignment
eect on the number of teams and productivity is negative, as shown in Figure 4, where
the slope of the tangent decreases (positive reallocation eect within rms).
The second eect is a transition from point B on PC 2 (PC 3) to point C on PC
2 (PC 3). At point B, all rms earn positive prot. This causes new entrants and
decentralizes workers (ltotalE;3 < l
total
E;1 ). In this transition, lE decreases by interval l
total
E;3
ltotalE;1 . This decentralization eect on the number of teams and productivity is negative,
as shown in Figure 4, where the slope of the tangent increases (negative reallocation
eect across rms).
A transition from point A to point B raises the labor input of the production division
by interval fd;2fd;1 (positive reallocation eect within rms) while a transition from point
B to point C reduces the labor input of the production division by interval ltotalT;3 l
total
T;1
(positive reallocation eect across rms). Since the interval ltotalT;3 l
total
T;1 is greater than the
interval fd;2fd;1, the slope of the tangent at point C is greater than that at point A. These
results indicate that an essential source of the division of labor in the long run is labor
reallocation across rms (the decentralization of labor promoted by new entrants).
6 Comparison with variable markup rate model
Can the abovementioned results be changed by a competitive environment? In this
section, we compare the eects of a decrease in fd between a constant markup rate
model and a variable markup rate model. We focus on a variable markup rate, such as
that depending on the number of rms. The model of Chaney and Ossa is also a variable
markup rate model in the sense that the markup rate depends on the aggregate labor
force, such as the model of Krugman (1979). However, the eect of a decrease in fd in
the model of Chaney and Ossa is the same as that of the constant markup rate model.
We formulate the markup rate as  = g(M), where g0(M) < 0 follows Blanchard and
Givazzi (2003).
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We should note that in such a model, we can obtain an equation such as (12). In the
short run, the eect of a decrease in fd in the variable markup rate model is the same as
that of the constant markup rate model because the number of rms is xed in the short
run and a procompetition eect does not occur. Hence, the magnitude of the short run
eect is the same in both models. However, they are dierent in the long run. How do
they dier?
In order to analyze this, we further decompose the eects of labor reallocation across
rms. In terms of these eect, the magnitude of (dtS=dlS)(@lS=@ME) is the same in
both models but (dME=dfd) is dierent. Then, we decompose dME=dfd as follows. M
depends on l from the labor market-clearing condition Ml = L. We let MLMC denote
the number of rms characterized by the labor market-clearing condition. l depends
on y from production function y = l2=2f . We let lPF denote the labor input in the
production division characterized by the production function. Hence, we obtain the
following condition
dME
dfd
=
dMLMC
dlPF| {z }
 
dlPF
dyE| {z }
+
dyE
dfd
: (13)
For the eects on the right-hand side, the magnitude of dMLMC=dlPF and dlPF=dyE are
the same in both models. Hence, the only dierence in both models is dyE=dfd.
In the variable model, dyE=dfd can be decomposed as follows
dyE
dfd
=
shift of FEz}|{
@yE
@fd|{z}
+
+
shift of PPz }| {
@yE
@|{z}
 
d
dME| {z }
 
dME
dfd
; (14)
From (13) and (14), we can nd dME=dfd < 0 and dyE=dfd > 0. The second term on
the right-hand side of (14) represents the procompetition eect. This eect is negative
from the following reason. In the short run, all rms make losses, and hence, some rms
exit the market in the long run. This is represented by dME=dfd < 0. This exit raises
the markup rate from the assumption of g0(M) < 0. This is explained as represented
by d=dMVM < 0 in (14). A decrease in the markup rate reduces p keeping y from
PP : p = MC(y). This enables rms to raise the output form FE : p = AC(y).
Otherwise, p < AC(y) holds and this makes rms exit the market. That is, rms raise
output in order to survive. This is explained by @yE=@ < 0.
From dyE=dfd > 0 and dtE=dfd = (dtE=dlPF )(dlPF=dyE)(dyE=dfd), we can obtain
dtE=dfd > 0. From dtE=dfd > 0, dyE=dfd > 0, (13), and (14) we can obtain the following
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conditions.
dtE
dfd
=
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@fd|{z}
 | {z }
reallocation within rms ({)
+
@tS
@ME| {z }
 
dME
dfd| {z }
 | {z }
reallocation across rms (+)
=
dtS
dlS
@lS
@fd| {z }
{
+
@tS
@ME| {z }
 
dMLMC
dyE| {z }
 
shift of FEz}|{
@yE
@fd|{z}
+| {z }
+
+
@tS
@ME| {z }
 
dMLMC
dyE| {z }
 
shift of PPz }| {
@yE
@
d
dfd| {z }
 | {z }
 
> 0: (15)
From (15), we can obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Under Assumption 1 and the variable markup rate, a decrease in xed
costs curbs the division of labor though labor reallocation based on the procompetition
eect promotes that.
We can explain the abovementioned analysis using Figure 5, in which initial equilib-
rium is shown in point E. A decrease in fd immediately shifts the FE curves downward.
Furthermore, a decrease in fd reduces the markup rate, , and this shifts the PP curve
downward. Then, new equilibrium is shown in point E 00 in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Equilibrium allocation and decrease in xed costs
Equilibrium point E 0 accounts for only an eect of a shift of FE and this point is
similar to equilibrium point E 0 of the constant markup rate model in Figure 3.
That is, the procompetition eect represents positive impact on the division of labor
while the eect of shift of FE represents negative impact on it. In other words, the
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procompetition eect represents labor concentration on operating rms while the eect
of shift of FE represents labor decentralization. Therefore, labor reallocation across
rms that accounts for a decrease in xed costs diers between both models.
These results are in contrast with Kamei (2014). Kamei (2014) incorporates Chaney
and Ossa's (2013) division of labor into a general oligopolistic equilibrium model with a
variable markup rate. The variable markup rate of Kamei (2014) depends on not only
the number of rms and but also rm output. Kamei (2014) does not impose a free-
entry and free-exit condition. In such a model, Kamei (2014) indicates that an increase
in the number of rms (exogenous change) curbs the division of labor. That is, labor
reallocation across rms based on the procompetition eect has a negative impact on the
division of labor. This is because an increase in the number of rms reduces the markup
rate, raises the real wage rate, and then, curbs the division of labor.
On the other hand, our variable markup rate model indicates that in a transition
from point E 0 to E 00 (procompetition eect), the division of labor is promoted. while
the number of rms, real wage rate increase, and rm output increase. This result can
be explained as follows. When the markup rate decreases through an increase in the
number of rms, rms face an increase in the real wage rate from PP : p = MC(y)
and raise output to attain zero prot from FE : p = AC(y). This promotes the division
of labor.
These results suggests that the free-entry and free-exit condition plays a key role
in determining the direction of labor reallocation across rms based on procompetition
eect.
7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the eects of a decrease in xed costs on the division of labor
within rms. We construct a xed-cost model that is quite similar to Chaney and Ossa
(2013). In addition, we formulate a variable markup rate model following Blanchard and
Givazzi (2003). Their variable markup rate depends on the number of rms.
In the constant markup rate model, a decrease in xed costs curbs the division of la-
bor. In the short run, the division of labor is promoted through labor reallocation within
rms while in the long run, the division of labor is curbed through labor reallocation
across rms. The latter eect dominates the former eect.
In the variable markup rate model, a decrease in xed costs induces labor reallocation
across rms which is the opposite direction of that of the constant markup rate model
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in addition although the direction of labor reallocation within rms is the same as that
of the constant markup rate model.
The direction of labor reallocation across rms based on procompetition is opposite
to that of the model of Kamei (2014), which does not impose the free-entry and free-exit
condition. The free-entry and free-exit condition plays a key role in determining the
direction of that reallocation based on procompetition eect.
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Appendix
Appendix.A: Derivation of some equations
Derivation of optimal core-competency of (2)
For minimization problem, l(!; !) = min!c2[!;!] l(!; !), we rewrite objective function
as follows:
l(!; !) =
1
2
Z !
!
j!c   !jd!
=

2
Z !c
!
(!c   !)d! +
Z !
!c
(!   !c)d!

=

2
 1
2

(!c   !)2
!c
!
+
1
2

(!   !c)2
!
!c

=

2

1
2
(!c   !)2 + 1
2
(!   !c)2

:
By minimizing l(!; !) with respect to !c, we can obtain the following rst order condition:
(!c   !)  (!   !c) = 0:
18
Hence, we have core-competency as follows
!cj[!;!] =
! + !
2
:
Derivation of l(!i; !i+1) of (3)
By substituting !cj[!;!] for !c of l(!; !), we can obtain the following equations:
l(!; !) =
1
2
Z !
!
j!cj[!;!]   !jd!
=

2
"
1
2

! + !
2
  !
2
+
1
2

!   ! + !
2
2#
=

2

!   !
2
2
:
l(!; !cj[!;!]) can be obtained as follows:
l(!; !cj[!;!]) =

2
Z !cj[!;!]
!
j!cj[!;!]   !jd!
=

4

(!c   !)2
!c
!
=

4

!   !
2
2
:
Hence, we can get l(!; !) = 2l(!; !cj[!;!]).
Derivation of llinejunit of (4)
We can obtain llinejunit of (4) from the following calculation:
llinejunit =t l(0; 2=t)
=2t l(0; 1=t) by (2) and (3)
=2t 1
2
Z 1=t
0
!d!
=t
 Z 1=t
0
!d!
!
:
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Derivation of optimal total cost function of (5)
l(t; y) = tf + lline = tf + (y)=(2t) and t(y) = [(y)=(2f)]
1=2 give optimal total cost
function of (5) as follows:
TC(y) =wfd + wl(t
; y)
=wfd + wft
 + w
 y
2t

by l(t; y) = tf + lline = tf + (y)=(2t)
=wfd + wf

y
2f
1=2
+ w
y
2

y
2f
 1=2
by t(y) = [(y)=(2f)]1=2
=wfd + wf
1=2y1=2

2
1=2
+

2

2
 1=2
=wfd + w(2fy)
1=2:
Appendix.B: Proof of Proposition 3
A relation between the number of team and marginal cost
We can obtain a relation between the number of team and marginal cost from the fol-
lowing calculation:
MC =
dTC(y; t)
dy
=
@TC(y; t)
@y
+
@TC(y; t)
@t| {z }
0
dt
dy
=
@TC(y; t)
@y
=
w
2t
:
20
A relation between the number of team and marginal labor productivity
We can obtain a relation between the number of team and marginal labor productivity
from the following calculation:
MPL =
dy
dl
=

dl(y; t)
dy
 1
=

MC
w
 1
=
2t

:
Appendix.C: Firm structure
Generality of the technology in (1)
Next, We examine that how general and valid the technology which we adopt in equation
(1) is in comparison to the one adopted by Chaney and Ossa (2013).
The technology we adopted is dierent from the one adopted by Chaney and Ossa
(2013), in two points. Equation (1) in this paper corresponds to the equation of Chaney
and Ossa (2013) as follows:
l(!; !) =
1
2
Z !
!

! + !
2
  !

d!: (C.1)
Equation (C.1) and (1) are equal, when  = 1 in (C.1) and  = 1 in (1).
We examine a characteristic of parameter,  by seeing shape of l(!; !). For simplicity,
we assume  = 1 and t = 1. When  = 1, the integral term of the right hand side in
(C.1) corresponds to the area formed by "Benchmark Line" shown in Figure 6. When
 > 1, the one corresponds to the area formed by "Curve H" shown in Figure 6. When
0 <  < 1, the one corresponds to the area formed by "Curve L" shown in Figure 6
implies that the eect of an increase in  is parallel to the eect of a decrease in .
If we adopts the technology in (A.1), the equilibrium allocation are rewritten by:
lE =
2( + 1)  
  ( + 1) fd;
yE =

 + 1
  ( + 1)fd
+1

 + 1
1
f

;
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Figure 6: comparison between sequential task structures
MPLE = ( + 1)


 + 1

 + 1
  ( + 1)

fd
f

;
tE =


 + 1

 + 1
  ( + 1)

fd
f
:
The next table shows that the eect of an increase in  is parallel to the eect of a
decrease in  on certain conditions.
Table 1
lE yE MPLE
? 0 + only if tE > 1 + only if tE > 1
's amplication an eect also occurs on certain conditions. Moreover, an eect of
f does not change. Therefore, this suggests that the technology which we adopt does
not loose generality quite much in comparison to the one adopted by Chaney and Ossa
(2013) .
Validity of the technology in (1)
Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) shows that almost all industries in OECD have
markup rate which belongs to set (1; 2). Therefore, the internal solution condition 2 < 
does not seems to have reality. This property highly depends on organization parameter
. If we adopts the technology in (C.1), internal solution condition is
 >  + 1:
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Therefore, by assuming organization parameter  to be in (0,1), model's mark-up rate
 can be consistent with the empirical studies.
However, assuming  to be in (0,1) makes tractability of the model decrease. For
analytical simplicity, we assume  to be 1.
Appendix D: Shape of PPE curve and FEE curve in Figure 3
In this section, we examine shape of PPE curve and FEE curve in Figure 3.
We dene Z(y) as dierence between right hand side of PPE relation and of FEE
relation:
Z(y)  
2

2f
y
1=2
 
"
2f
y
1=2
+
fd
y
#
= B(2f)1=2y 1=2   fdy 1:
Certainly, Z(yE) = 0 holds.
The derivative of function Z(y) is given by
Z 0(y) =  2 1B(2f)1=2y 3=2 + fdy 2:
When y = yE, Z
0(yE) = 0 holds, where y

E is given by
yE = 2
fd
B2f
= 4
fd
B22f
= 4yE:
From B > 0, when y < 4yE, Z
0(y) > 0 holds and when y > 4yE, Z 0(y) < 0 holds.
Furthermore, for the second order derivative of function Z(y), Z 00(64yE=9) = 0 holds.
The limits of function Z(y) are given by
lim
y!1
Z(y) = 0;
lim
y!0
Z(y) =  1:
The above relations are proved in the following manner.
Proof.
lim
y!1
Z(y) = lim
y!1
B(2f)1=2y1=2   fd
y
=
0  fd
1 ! 0;
lim
y!0
Z(y) = lim
y!0
B(2f)1=2y1=2   fd
y
=
 fd
0
!  1:
Q.E.D.
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According to the above results, the shape of Z(y) is the one as shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7: the shape of Z(y)
Figure 7 is consistent to Figure 3 and hence, Figure 3 is supported.
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